This paper examines the fundamental meanings of the concepts of “subject” and “subjectivity” in Western political philosophy, aiming to place them within the context of modern Ukraine. The discourses on Ukraine-as-a-subject are examined in relation to the two contradictory senses of subjectivity: (a) autonomous, self-possessing, and (b) dependent, belonging subject. As the idea of an autonomous subject in Western political thought is closely related to colonial ideology and practice, this concept should be replaced with the notion of the historical, dependent subject, which is shaped by the political regime it belongs to. Consequently, the paper argues that the sense of a belonging subject (b) better reflects the actual practices of subjection, because it captures the factor of belonging to the community and presupposes the ethical, normative impact of the political collective on its subjects. Aristotle’s first systematic use of the word subject (to hupokeimenon) is based on the verb “to belong” (hupokeimai), from which the Latin civis (citizen) is also derived. Accordingly, the true ‘autonomy’ of the subject lies in the ability to choose one’s ‘belonging’ and to participate in a political community that reinterprets and changes one’s own intellectual tradition. In this case, the historicity of the subject does not mean a fateful and singular History, but rather a multiplicity of stories that give meaning and value to their subjects. The only way to partake in the act of subjectivation is through self-regulated education, which molds the social subject within the community. In the case of Ukraine, this primarily means that political power should be locally generated through civil institutions and groups that play a normative role in society. Only when education and political organization become a res publica can subjectivation be a liberating practice, as envisioned by the theorists of the Enlightenment.

**Keywords:** subject, subjectivity, subjectivation, political philosophy, philosophy of history, philosophy of education, Ukraine.

**Introduction**

The concept of subjectivity is extensive and difficult to define, which makes it broad and ambiguous, yet highly relevant and influential in contemporary discussions. It encompasses virtually everything, as nearly all aspects of our existence can be viewed as a “subject” — be it within our thoughts, scientific analysis, or socio-political frameworks. This article aims to bring clarity to the terms “subject” and “subjectivity” within the realm of political philosophy, while also emphasizing their problematic character.

As of a Ukrainian actively involved in and observing ongoing discussions about Ukraine’s subjectivity, the author’s intent is twofold: firstly, to provide conceptual tools for these discussions, and secondly, to emphasize the importance of rethinking “subjects” and “subjectivity” to foster the development of new common identities.

In pursuit of these objectives, this paper explores the discussion on subjectivity in both classical and modern political philosophy, aiming to define the role of the subject within these frameworks. Specifically, a distinction is made between the meanings of the “active subject” (a) as posited by Enlightenment thinkers like I. Kant and G.W.F. Hegel, and the meaning of the “belonging subject” (b), which corresponds to the original meaning of the term “subject” (to hupokeimenon) and was expounded upon by A. Gramsci and M. Foucault.

This paper poses the primary question: which of these two concepts more accurately reflects the cur-
rent political reality and enables meaningful engagement and transformation? The conclusion drawn suggests a synthesis of these notions, one that upholds the historical context and moral responsibility inherent in the Enlightenment’s “active subject” (a). However, it remains critical of its colonial implications, thereby favoring the notion of the “belonging subject” (b) — characterized by group, community, and societal affiliations.

Having defined the concept of subjectivity concerning political praxis, attention turns to discourses surrounding Ukraine’s subjectivity both before and after the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24th, 2022. The subsequent query aims to discern the prevailing understanding of subjectivity within these discourses and explore the potential reimagining through the lens of the “belonging subject” (b). In this context, “Ukraine” refers not only to the Ukrainian state but also encompasses civil and political actors, such as NGOs and activists, who wield normative influence in Ukrainian society, actively shaping collective subjectivities within it.

For the purposes of this inquiry, it is necessary to initially clarify the precise relationship between the concept of the subject and an abstract, generalized entity such as a country or a state. Recent scholarly and journalistic discussions around Ukraine often reference Ukraine’s agency or subjectivity without offering a clear definition of what “Ukraine” signifies or which empirical actors it represents (cf. Bauer, 2023; Kozlenko, 2022). Does it signify the Ukrainian state and its officials? The entirety of Ukrainian civil society? The collective “people of Ukraine,” as often phrased by Volodymyr Zelensky? Or does it denote the idealized concept of Ukraine as a nation?

For I. Kant, who serves as a starting point of the analysis, there exists no conflict between the agency of the state and that of the autonomous subject, insofar as the will of the state, embodied in the statesman (monarch), aligns with the dictate of reason shared by every rational and mature (mündig) individual subject (Kant, 1999). Despite significant departures from Kant in his acknowledgment of historicity, Hegel shares a similar attitude regarding the relationship between state and individual. He regards the state as the ultimate subject of will, “the moral whole,” which subjects every singular will of the moral subject to itself as its “part” (Hegel, 1994, p. 21).

In the discourses of Gramsci and Foucault, however, the interplay between the individual subjectivity and the “will” or agency of the state assumes a form of a dichotomy, to the extent that the “subjectivity” or “agency” of the state is, by definition, in conflict with the agency of the political subjects, who do not belong to the ruling class and are subjugated or marginalized by the state. In this paper, to avoid this dichotomy without “returning” to the conservative roots of Kant’s and Hegel’s political theory, Ukraine’s subjectivity is neither referred to as a transcendent unity of the State (be it a metaphysical figure of an Absolute Spirit or the empirical representatives of the state) nor as a vague rhetorical figure of “people of Ukraine.” Instead, it is defined as an organized political community that is responsible for itself and shares common language, culture, history, interests, and values. This community holds the capability and should act against state power and economic elites if their actions conflict with the interests of the community.

The significance of this community and its role became evident during critical periods such as the 2014 revolution and the immediate aftermath of the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022. In the face of the current political and social fragmentation, which is an inevitable consequence of the continuous war, the conceptualization of collective subjectivity gains even more significance. The framework which is introduced in this paper by synthesizing the idea of the Enlightenment “active subject” with the notions of belonging and dependency allows for a conception of freedom and common will based on interdependence which contradicts the morality of subjugation to the transcendent singular Subject. Conceptually, this aligns closely with T. Negri’s and Hardt’s idea of the “multitude”, albeit without positioning it as a force in opposition to the globalized “Empire”.

It is crucial to note that this inquiry does not aim for a finite and deterministic idea of a subject. Instead, it aims to highlight the potential of collective rethinking and reshaping of subjectivity beyond binaries like individual versus state or passivity versus activity. The focus lies on actual practices transforming the amorphous (as termed by Gramsci) into normative and political subjects. These practices, broadly termed educational, intend to cultivate values and produce shared knowledge forming the foundation of what Kant called the “common use of reason.” Examples like Paulo Freire’s “problem-posing” education (Freire, 2000) or the practice of service-learning (Jacoby, 2014) illustrate how applying Enlightenment ideals to subjectivation practices involves transitioning from the concept of independent individuals to interdependent groups shaping the normative basis of the political community, which cannot be reduced to “individuals and their families” or a transcendent state (comprising both the empirical government and the idealized “whole”).
In this research, the comparative method and discursive analysis are employed to clarify the prevalent privileging of certain frames of thinking, particularly highlighting the dominance of the (a) “active subject” over the (b) “passive subject” in discourses concerning political philosophy and Ukraine’s subjectivity. Additionally, a post-colonial methodology is utilized to uncover the imperialistic and “othering” effects inherent in the classical notion of the “subject”.

Structured along the central line of argumentation, the text unfolds in three distinct parts. The initial section, “Subject as Historical Category: Ukrainian Discourse on Subjectivity before and after February 24th,” offers a comprehensive definition of the term “historical subject”. It also presents a fragmentary overview of the discourse surrounding Ukraine as a political community from its early years of independence until the present moment.

The subsequent section, “Culture and Education as Normative Processes of Subjectivation: The In-War and Post-War Subjectivity in Ukraine,” delves into the concept of the “dependent subject”. It establishes connections with existing processes of subjectivation, aiming to chart a path towards new cultures of subjectivation that build upon pre-existing structures within Ukrainian society.

The last part of the paper, called “The Ends of Subjectivity,” summarizes the research and calls for a new model of subjectivity. This proposed model harmonizes the historicity and responsibility inherent in the (a) “active subject” with the sense of belonging and participation embodied by the (b) “passive subject”. The paper contends that this model should inform self-regulatory processes of subjectivation, fostering the creation of new collective identities within Ukrainian communities.

Subject as a Historical Category. Ukrainian Discourse on Subjectivity before and after February 24th

M. Foucault once stated that the leitmotif of his philosophical work comes down to one question — “the question of subject.” He regarded the subject as a pivotal political category, as every political system operates by subjecting individuals to various forms of control (Foucault, 1994, p. 222). This understanding of subjectivity, rather than the notion of an “autonomous” and “self-sufficient” individual, proves particularly valuable when discussing modern politics and the global economy. It is important to note that subjectification (also interchangeably referred to as “objectification” by Foucault) is not inherently good or bad; its potential lies in its capacity to be both oppressive and liberating, depending on the political conditions under which it operates.

Since “subjectivity per se” is an empty concept, for the very word implies a degree of individualization, we can only approach subjectivity conceptually by considering specific forms and cultures of subjectivation within a concrete political context. The choice to focus on the Ukrainian context is obvious, yet challenging, given its extensive history of oppression by hegemonic political powers, as well as the long quest for subjectivity 1, which has now reached a critical point. It is this very weight of history that bestows existential significance upon the ongoing struggle of Ukrainians against the neo-imperialist Russia.

Recently there has appeared a growing number of texts discussing Ukraine as a subject, both in academic and journalistic contexts. Most of these texts are written by Ukrainians. Here is an excerpt from Ivan Kozlenko’s article “Ukraine as an Active Subject: In Search of a New Language”: “The international legal system, humanitarian discourse and historical concepts have to be revised to take Ukraine’s agency into account. Among other factors, our understanding of the Holocaust has to take into account Ukraine’s historical continuity and its understanding of its own historical past. This is not revisionism but a mere acknowledgement of the fact that continuing to ignore Ukraine as an important agent in historical processes throughout the 20th century and retaining Soviet colonial constructs picked up by the West prevents us from developing an objective picture of the past and the future” (Kozlenko, 2022).

Here, the term “active subject” refers to both one’s historicity and autonomy. One of the key points of the text is that the Soviet appropriation and monopolization of the “eastern bloc” with dozens of singular histories and cultures were uncritically accepted in the West, especially within the context of Germany, part of which was directly indoctrinated by the Soviet Russia: “As long as entrenched myths of the ‘great Russian culture’ — parallel to the ongoing hostilities — continue to be perpetuated in German theaters and opera houses, while self-proclaimed experts rely on Russian propaganda narratives in opinion pages and talk shows, and disinformation finds fertile ground in the German media discourse, critical questions (even self-critical ones) must be allowed — and the responsibilities must also be sought in local cultural-political structures based on outdated assumptions” (Bauer, 2023).

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However, the pursuit of autonomy should not be seen exclusively through the lens of a basic dichotomy between “independence” and “dependency”. An active subject does not necessarily imply a sovereign that stands “above” and “aside” from the others. The concept of an “autonomous” subject, as traditionally used in Western political thought (Muthu, 2012), often implies a certain form of the “master-slave” dichotomy. Alternatively, this concept can be replaced by the notion of the historical subject. Such conceptualization brings one closer to an empirical and circumstantial understanding, moving away from the “universal” ego (“I”) advocated by figures like Descartes (Foucault, 1994, p. 231).

Discussions about “subjectivity” in modern Ukraine mainly focus on two topics: Ukraine’s political and cultural autonomy and Ukrainians’ self-perception, primarily within the internal Ukrainian discourse. While both of those questions are of importance, there are other senses of subjectivity that remain unaddressed within these discussions. To identify them, one must consider the discourses surrounding Ukraine-as-a-subject before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 as well as the traditional meanings associated with this concept outside of the realm of “realpolitik”.

In a 1998 article cited in Y. Hrytsak’s book “Passions Around Nationalism...”, American researcher W. Zimmerman poses the question: “Is Ukraine a Political Community?” Translated into primitive juridical terms, the question would sound: “whose subject is Ukraine?” It also encompasses the two contrasting notions of subjectivity prevalent in the Western political history: that of the active subject (a) and that of the belonging subject (b).

The article puts the “Ukrainian community” on the same scales as the “Russian community” and asks whether there exists a substantial difference between the two or whether the former simply “belongs” to the latter (Zimmerman, 1998, p. 44.) Without even considering the presuppositions and unquestioned assumptions that lead the author to regard the question of Ukrainian subjectivity as determined by the relation to “Russian society” (beyond mere historical ones), it is very important to observe that subjectivity is viewed here primarily as developing through a contrast or opposition to a certain defined other. This seemingly obvious viewpoint is also deeply rooted in the tradition of modern European political philosophy.

Antonio Gramsci, one of the classics of modern political theory, discussed the task of granting subjectivity to previously anonymous masses and formulated it as “giving personality to the amorphous” (dare personalità all’amorfo) (Gramsci, 1977, p. 1392). This notion of personality or form inherently involves singling out, distinguishing, and making distinctions. This principle also underlies the discourse on subjectivity in pre-2022 Ukraine. In a paper written in 2020 called “Subjectivity of Ukraine in the modern world: assessments, strategies, prognoses” Ukrainian political scientists attempt to define Ukraine as a “global [geo-political] subject with the traits of European identity,” “subject of Western civilization” (Maiboroda, 2020, p. 5).

The definitions mentioned clearly intend to establish a distinction, particularly between Western and Eastern civilizations, or European and non-European ones. However, they also inherently assign value to the elements they single out. The concept of “civilization” itself, even before its specific application by authors like Norbert Elias or Samuel Huntington, was used to attribute value to individuals who establish states and live within them, namely the citizens (civis), as opposed to non-citizens — often referred to as “barbarians” or “nomads” — who lack a settled, state-like political structure. Thus, being a subject of (Western) “civilization” inevitably implies, on a micro-level, being a subject of a state.

The word civis shares the same root with the Greek verb keimai, which i. a. means “belong”. This is the same verb Aristotle employs to refer to the entity later translated as “subjectus” and known to us as “subject” — “to hupokeimenon” or the underlying material from which things are formed. M. Foucault would correct Gramsci on his statement about the “amorphous” mass. The very act of defining a group as a “mass” already distinguishes it from the non-mass group 1; “[…] the state’s power,” says Foucault, “(and that’s one of the reasons for its strength) is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power” (Foucault, 1994, p. 229). This implies that the state produces mass subjects who, in turn, belong to the state. Gramsci eventually arrives at a similar conclusion when he refers to the mass subject as a “thing” (una cosa), alluding to the fatalism and determinism of “common sense” (senso commune), which compels mass subjects to delegate their agency to the “rule of things” (forza delle cose) — fate as a higher appropriating force.

1 Gramsci highlights that the term “intellectual” retains the connotation of a “specialist” in its original sense ascribed to churchmen, or “ecclesiastici” (Gramsci, 1975, p. 1515). The word “ekklēsia” in Ancient Greek refers to a church or assembly and is derived from the verb “ekklēsiazō”, meaning “to call” or “summon”. “Klērós” fundamentally denotes one’s fate or “portion” and implies the circle of “the chosen ones” or “special individuals” in contrast to the “layman”.

2 In the sense of Hegel’s famous “Herr-Knecht” dialectics, formulated in his “Phenomenology of Spirit” (cf. Hegel, 1999).
On the contrary, Gramsci encourages the subject to become an agent, a “historical person” (persona storica) who takes responsibility for their actions. This resonates strongly with the Enlightenment concept formulated by Kant in his article “Was ist Aufklärung?” ("What is Enlightenment?"), which Foucault also references (Foucault, 1994, p. 231). We encounter the classical opposing notions of the subject: the one who possesses (a), in the sense of possessing oneself and one’s will, and the one who is possessed (b) or belongs. However, the crucial aspect is the sense of historicity, inherent to subjectivity, which designates an individual as a historical subject of a specific era. According to Foucault, this historicity constitutes the uniqueness of Kant’s question about Enlightenment, as it no longer pertains to the “general I” but rather to the historical experience of a particular “I” in the present moment (Foucault, 1994, p. 785).

Turning to the 2020 paper, we see that the authors try to link subjectivity of Ukraine with the history of the “western civilization,” which would also position Ukraine as a sujet (topic or theme) of world history. For better or worse, Ukraine became such a sujet in February 2022, first as a subject of an aggressor’s will (b) and later as a subject with one’s own agency (a). These contemporary notions of subjectivity, as well as the concept of “world history”, trace back to the era of European colonial conquests when the term “civilization” acquired its infamous meaning — the Age of the Enlightenment. G.W.F. Hegel, one of the last Enlightenment figures, elevated “world history” to the niveaux of the highest philosophical subject.

According to Hegel (and similarly framed by Gramsci), world history requires a conscious subject that perceives itself as a rational agent driving the course of events. This led Hegel to categorize peoples as either historical or ahistorical, with the former incorporating oneself into “world history”, while the latter were unable to conceive of themselves as individuals and thus compelled to accept their “fate” and submit to their (civilized European) rulers (Hegel, 1924, p. 75). This sense of subjectivity still lingers whenever the “subject of Western civilization” is mentioned 4.

However, there is another aspect of subjectivity and subjectification that connects the modern concept of world history with the earlier sense of “historia” — that of “determination.” Historia originally referred to any inquiry into a particular subject, such as the early philosophical texts titled “historia peri phuseòs” — literally meaning “inquiry into nature.” The histori, or inquirer, not only describes a subject but also sets it apart from others, which is why histor also signified a “judge”. Consequently, every historia possesses a normative sense, signifying its subject-matter by terminating it. Furthermore, no subject can exist without a history that constitutes it. Since history marks and characterizes the subject, it also partially determines its further course. Hence, Hegel’s world history as well as classical historia is ultimately teleological in its character, i.e. directed towards a final goal that subordinates its subject and transforms it into a tool 6.

**Culture and Education as Normative Processes of Subjectivation. The In-War and Post-War Subjectivity in Ukraine**

This brief historical and morphological exploration highlights the problematic side of the concept of subjectivity. As a modern notion deeply rooted in the discourse of Enlightenment, the figure of a sovereign subject is determined by the master-slave dialectics, as evidenced by the imperialist rhetoric of Enlightenment thinkers like Hegel. Therefore, one should be extremely cautious when defining Ukraine as a “subject of western civilization.”

Nevertheless, there is a significant basis for such definitions, which also explains the modern origin of the concept of subjectivity. The modern subject is no longer subjugated to the state or church but is seen as an individualized and historical entity. This presupposes a modern notion of a free nation as opposed to the aristocratic state of the ancient régime. It also explains why subjectivity is associated with differentiation and individuation, rather than mere belonging and subordination.

In fact, however, modern nation-states are often only nominally free, as they tend to represent a culture and interests of i. a. economically privileged groups (or states). In the case of Ukraine, we can observe the tremendous effort it took and continues to take in order to offset the hegemonic Russian culture, which historically positioned itself as “sovereign.” The experience of soft power, exercised through cultural hegemony and translated through

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4 Same is true about “Russkiy Mir” (Russian world), deemed as the ideological opponent of the West while using its old colonial rhetorical tools to appropriate the histories of numerous cultures as one totalizing subject of a singular History (cf. Polegkyi & Bushuyev, 2022).

6 Hegel and early Marx employ the phrase “instrument” or “das unbewusste Werkzeug der Geschichte” (“the unconscious tool of history”), referring to a higher hierarchical power (such as Napoleon or British colonizers) that subjugates the “lower” to its “will,” aligning it with the “Will of History” (cf. Marx, 1970, p. 133).
connection between the subject and the subject matter and encourage one to influence and mediums such as Russian language, music, literature turns into open violence, when this culture is no longer passively accepted as dominant, as it happened during the Revolution of Dignity in 2014.

Furthermore, there is yet another dimension of “culture”, which is not limited to the macroeconomic and geopolitical level, encompassing the realm of local, traditional, and customary practices. It is within this sphere that the functioning modes of subjectivity and subjectivation are determined. Becoming “cultured” does not necessarily require attending formal educational institutions, as we already belong to a given culture, carrying its habits and traits. The role of the education, in a broader sense, is rather to foster awareness of this culture and encourage one to influence and transform it (Gramsci, 1977, p. 1332). Considering the inherent connection between the subject and the subject matter (subjectus), it is crucial to emphasize that the process of education, involving differentiation and definition of certain subjects, is necessarily a normative one, as it emphasizes which subjects do matter and which are deemed less significant.

The traditional sense of education as “virtuosity” refers to the cultivation of specific virtues (areté), which involves acquiring a habit through continuous repetition until it becomes a “dominant or regular disposition or tendency” (Crespo, 2010, p. 50). The development of such habits is regulated both internally, through moral principles, and externally, through laws and legal obligations. In Ukraine, there’s a growing tendency towards more self-organized and relatively autonomous educational and cultural initiatives, such as educational platforms or media like UA: PBC. However, a significant amount of work remains to shift away from the exclusively state-managed education and towards bottom-up structures that allow for normative and value-giving processes originating within the civil society.

If the essence of being a subject is not “independence” (a), but rather dependence and belonging (b), it implies that the true autonomy lies in the ability to choose “where I belong” and partake in a political community that rethinks and reshapes one’s own intellectual tradition. Being a historical subject means having the capacity to distinguish and conceptualize oneself as an integral part of such a community. In this context, history does not represent a singular, fate-like dominant force, but rather a plurality of historias that gives significance and value to its subjects, enabling normative processes like education as a self-regulated form of subjectivation.

Education, understood as “form-giving”, should not be solely about appropriating the given subject matter for the benefit of the State, as in Hegelian teleology. As Foucault suggests, “we have to promote new forms of subjectivity,” which does not necessarily imply abandoning the state institutions, but rather cultivating new pedagogical approaches that can be implemented both within traditional educational structures and community-like institutions such as NGOs or think-tanks.

In order to prevent the state from producing mass-subjects and treating individuals as fitting economic units, which tends to happen in a politically stagnant society like modern Russia, political power should be generated locally within the civil society. Regardless of the type of institution (school, university, NGO etc.), they always play a normative and instructive role towards their subjects, which means they cannot be “apolitical”. However, being “objective” and fulfilling an “organizing” (in Gramsci’s language), form-giving role for the communities they contribute to is essential.

What does this form of objectification (or subjectivation) mean specifically for the in-war and post-war Ukraine? Firstly, it involves reflecting upon new semi-institutional practices such as volunteering and activist groups, which often operate with greater transparency and efficiency than bureaucratic state institutions. This includes not only large-scale projects like “Comeback Alive,” but also smaller local initiatives like “frontline.care” or feminist projects like “FemSolution”.

Although the effectiveness of such communities largely depends on urgent military and social needs, given the backdrop of the common Russian threat, it doesn’t diminish the importance of the structures established by these organizations, which can be further utilized for educational and cultural purposes. The “care-work”, which in this case clearly serves an external objective, can develop an intrinsic value as it emerges from the shadows of everyday life and is portrayed in a positive and encouraging manner.

Secondly, as a means to critically engage with and reshape the intellectual tradition, it is crucial to extensively explore war as a historical process with its tragic and paradoxical “forming” impact on society. Educational practices must develop conceptual tools that enable a thorough understanding of the

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1. The notion of objectivity, in this case, stems from the noun, rather than the adjective “objective”. It refers to being directed towards specific goals, which inherently involve political and ethical orientations. For instance, when “cultivating” a lawyer, the aim is to develop a specialist, who can navigate various moral and legal codes depending on the particular case, thus reflecting normative inclination. Even if this normative inclination seemingly implies a “relativistic” morale, it is nonetheless a moral one, for its objective is to align the ethical principles (habitual principles of conduct or directives) with the given juridical context and not vice versa (cf. Piccone, 1968, p. 417).
distinguishing features of the “in-war” period, as this understanding is essential for effectively transitioning to the “post-war” period. The embodied experiences of individuals and communities affected by war should be transformed into coherent forms of knowledge that serve as both instructive self-images of society and catalysts for modifying habitual patterns and the “in-war” customs.

When we look at the examples of post-World War II West-Germany and Russia, it becomes evident how educational reforms in the former case, albeit controlled by external government, led to the cultivation of self-critical societies, while their absence in the latter case contributed to the development of dogmatic and uncritical “masses”. There is an obvious link between the doctrinaire, glorifying image of the “Conquerors of Fascism” in the Soviet Union and the development of fascist cult of the past and certain eschatological, fatalistic ideology in modern Russia. It also demonstrates the fundamental ideological role of the educational institutions in fashioning and normalizing the war-rhetoric under Putin, which is shaped around the common image of Russia’s “heroic” mission in the “world-history”.

Conclusion. The Ends of Subjectivity

This episodic analysis of subjectivity reveals that as historical subjects, our formation and regulation are deeply influenced by the institutions and traditions that govern our habitual practices. By critically reflecting on these habits and traditions, particularly those stemming from recent historical transformations, within the context of education, we gain the ability to transform them according to our interests and needs, thereby exerting a normative impact.

The first essential step towards making subjectivation a self-regulating practice, rather than an alienating one, is to articulate words and concepts that encompass our diverse experiences. This enables us to form communities based on shared practices and languages, rather than merely belonging to the same state or other transcendent entities.

The end of subjectivity should not be the over-determination by global geopolitical (“civilisatory”) or economic narratives, but rather the establishment of ethical, political, and organizing civil institutions capable of addressing the concerns and struggles of their subjects. These institutions should have a transformative and form-giving effect on the habitual practices (ethos) of individuals if they are to develop new forms of knowledge.

What we need is not a new Kantian “Metaphysics of Morals,” which ultimately goes against Kant’s own project in “Was ist Aufklärung” and tries to dishistorize and depoliticize the “pure moral subject”. Instead, we should acknowledge the intrinsically historical, political, and normative character of every subjectivation process. Only through such a concrete and comprehensive understanding of subjectivity can bottom-up educational processes emerge, fostering emancipation and active participation. These processes have the potential to intersect with and transform bureaucratic state institutions, creating collective subjects within a community defined by shared values and political responsibilities.

Of course, it is important to acknowledge that this generalization oversimplifies the distinct intellectual climates present in the separately governed regions of Germany. However, it does underscore the contrasting treatment of “intellectuals” and the “masses” (in accordance with Gramscian terminology) between Stalin’s USSR (as well as the Soviet-controlled GDR) and post-NS West-Germany (cf. Puaca, 2009).

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1 This notion is both conceptually flawed and devoid of meaning. The term “ethos” encompasses more than just “custom” (which links it to “Sitte” as mores and manners). Primarily, it refers to habit and tendency: in Homer, aethon denotes “after one’s wont,” implying the “usual” or the realm of usage and practicality, meaning the economic sphere or the sphere of objectives. In Aristotle’s framework, the economic realm is fundamentally subordinated to the political, which renders ethos, in its basic sense, an inherently political concept. Thus, in any specific case, ethos can only be comprehended within the broader context of the general economic and regulating tendencies of a given political community (cf. Crespo, 2010, p. 51).
Бойко Ю. Ю.

ДВА ЦЕНТРАЛЬНІ ЗНАЧЕННЯ ПОНЯТТЯ СУБ’ЄКТИВНОСТІ ТА ЇХ ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ В ПОЛІТИЧНОМУ КОНТЕКСТІ СУЧАСНОЇ УКРАЇНИ

У цій статті висвітлено основні значення поняття «суб’єкт» і «суб’єктивність» у західній політичній філософії з метою локалізації їх у контексті сучасної України. Дискурси про Україну-як-суб’єкт проаналізовано з огляду на два суперечливі сенси суб’єктивності: (а) автономний і (б) залежний (belonging) суб’єкт. Оскільки ідея автономного суб’єкта в західній політичній думці тісно пов’язана з колоніальною ідеологією і практикою, цю концепцію слід замінити альтернативним поняттям історичного, залежного суб’єкта, який формується політичним режимом, до якого він належить. У статті стверджується, що поняття «залежний суб’єкт» адекватніше відображає політичні практики суб’єктивування, адже воно фіксує фактор належності до спільноти й передбачає відповідну нормативну роль у суб’єкті-частці. Перший систематичний вжиток слова суб’єкт Аристотелем (to hupokeimenon) ґрунтується на дієслові «належати» (hupokeimai), від якого також походять латинська civis (громадянин). Відповідно, справжня «автономія» суб’єкта полягає в можливості обирати свою належність і брати участь у політичній спільноті, яка переосмислює та змінює власну інтелектуальну традицію. В цьому випадку історичність суб’єкта не означає доленосну й сингулярну Історію, а радше множинність історій, які надають значення та цінність своїм суб’єктам. Єдиним способом активної суб’єктування є процес саморегульованого виховання — формування соціального суб’єкта всередині спільноти. У випадку України це насамперед означає, що політична влада має генеруватись локально через громадянські інституції і групи, які відіграють нормативну роль у суспільстві. Лише коли освіта та політична організація стають res publica, суб’єктування може бути еманципативною практикою, які задумували теоретики Просвітництва.

Ключові слова: суб’єкт, суб’єктність, суб’єктивація, політична філософія, філософія історії, філософія освіти, Україна.

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